U.S. Policy toward Iranian Nuclear Capability

U.S. Policy toward Iranian Nuclear Capability


In the 1950s, United States of America in collaboration with the Islamic Republic of Iran launched a nuclear program, as part of the Atoms for Peace Program. Since 1979, the two nations have ever since been skeptical of each other. They have persistently portrayed a philosophical dislike to each others’ way of life. Iraq’s substantial development toward assembly of nuclear weapons was exposed during the Gulf War. Because of this fact, the U.S. reservation is that Iran is also pursuing a program on nuclear weapons. Despite the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is argued that Iran has chemical weaponry. The U.S has appropriately resolved that Iran must be barred from mounting a nuclear weapons capacity. Despite of this, the U.S. has selected a guiding principle that undercuts features of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Stephen, 2007).

U.S. Policy                                                                                                                      

Bill Clinton’s regime instigated a rule of dual containment upon prior history of Iran and Iraq. It endeavored to control Iran owing to its alleged efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Declarations uttered by former speaker of the parliament of Iran Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani (1988) and vice president Ataollah Mohajerani (1991) are instances used by the U.S. to exhibit Iran’s nuclear aspirations. The United States is sturdily not in favor of Iran developing a nuclear weapon and its suppression policy portrays this ambition. Based on paraphernalia and facts used during nuclear power-generating programs, the U.S. chief intention has been to prevent Iran from obtaining any nuclear equipment, expertise, and technical know-how. In order to fulfill this mission, Bill Clinton placed an absolute trade ban on Iran. Despite the ban being unilateral, the United States has attempted to convert it into a multilateral understanding.

Conjugal export control regulations in the United States relating to Iran were established to avert virtually all trade with Iran. As a measure to stop Iran from developing a weapon of mass destruction, the United States has acted unilaterally owing to missing international or accord concerning Iran. U.S. unilateral actions to contain Iran dealings are based upon economic sanctions, restricted imports and exports, and bar of foreign aids. In relation to Iran’s supposed nuclear aspirations, an export control is the most essential policy to put a stop to Iran’s acquisition of expertise, material, and machinery (William, 2007).

As per the records related to the U.S. ballpark figure, Iran is capable of developing a nuclear weapon within a period of 5-15years. However, Iran is not the only state that is able to develop nuclear weapons within 15 years. Consequently, Iran is not actually the only threat and that the U.S. should endorse a more strict policy. On the other hand, Iran has shown off American accusations that it is developing weapons of mass destruction. Despite its association to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and recurrent open guarantees that it is not developing nuclear weapons, Iran has reasonable grounds to fear Iraq’s military potential. Security concerns strengthen Iran’s ploy of obtaining the essential elements to consider a nuclear alternative. Unrelenting growth of Israel’s assumed nuclear capability and the broadening of nuclear weapons on the Asian subcontinent justifies Iranian worries. Iran also thinks it is being deprived of essential right of entry to passive nuclear technology by the Western states regardless of its loyalty to the NPT and its approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapons program are numerous. Not only would it be tremendously worrying to nations like Israel and other neighboring countries, but it would also be considered as a subterfuge of troubles for U.S. interests especially in protective aid to the Gulf. One way to influence Iran would be the development of better associations with America. However, this will only be forthcoming if Iran alters its approach and conduct towards Israel. For noteworthy alteration in American policy, Iran will have to back off on its anti-Israel policy.

Iran’s situation

In order to make a decision whether to build up nuclear weapons, Iran would have to first establish the expenses and remuneration of doing so. Majorly, the limitation is that a nuclear weapons program would breach Iran’s position as a non-nuclear weapons state in relation to the NPT, and its preserved accord with the IAEA. Since 1958, Iran has been an affiliate of the IAEA. The global community, through U.N. declarations, would most probably enforce economic sanctions on Iran like the case on Iraq. Additionally, Iran would be obligated to dissolve its nuclear weapons program, despite the immense cost of production. Iran’s political and economic associations with other nations would be affected tremendously if evidence of a stealthy nuclear weapons program is unearthed. As a result, Iran will be absolutely isolated from the global system hence tarnishing an economy already under pressure to recover from its extensive confrontation with Iraq. Iran has to realize that nuclear weapons cannot augment its regional prestige for the reason that the existence of weapons of mass destruction has to remain absolutely hidden in order to avoid raising eye brows from the international community. Strong doubts based on Iranian alleged development of nuclear weapon capabilities could bring about IAEA scrutiny, which could depict Iran’s nuclear weapons ambition (Fayazmanesh, 2008).

Iran is obligated to openly deny the existence of a nuclear weapons plan. Retreating from the NPT is also not possible since by doing so, it would act as a confirmation of global doubts concerning Iran’s nuclear intentions and most likely provoke a harmful international reaction. An economic ground that forbids Iran from mounting a nuclear weapons program also exists. A nuclear weapons program is extremely costly, particularly after Iran’s eight-year war with Iraq. Furthermore, since its war with Iraq, Iran has been reconstructing its essential infrastructure and defense by borrowing huge sums of money. Furthermore, high inflation rates, joblessness and rapidly growing population have crippled Iran’s economic potency. Therefore, Iran has no economic ability to sustain a stealthy nuclear weapons program owing to its current economic melt down (Congressional Information Service, 1993).

As a result of the ‘neighborhood’ in which Iran finds itself in, many proponents of nuclear weapons have a basis of their arguments in favor of the country’s recent proliferation of the same. This is also in line with the ideations that the nation is bound to be a leader both in its region as well as internationally. Indeed, Iran has been noted as asserting itself in the Middle East region, and its advanced technology is set to push this agenda forward. At the same time, Iran considers the West and its regional allies as being in constant domination of its interests, thereby reducing any chances of fair competition in any markets. Nuclear weapons thus seem as the only solution for this small yet powerful nation even though such activities have never been proven beyond the shadow of a doubt.

There are other factors that lie in favor of Iran’s activities as pertains nuclear materials, or weapons as others assert. From its adversaries in the past, Iraq, Iran has found out that they are indeed a force to reckon with. Despite the past occurrences between the two nations where Iran has been on the receiving end, it has come to re-strategize thereby changing the playing field altogether. In addition, the U.S invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan has left Iran at the pedestal of the nations in the Middle East and it is thus powerful now more than ever.

However, this has not meant that Iran have slept at the job as they realize that any resurgence of Iraq as a Middle East powerhouse would render them vulnerable to attacks directly form their neighbors. This has been an additional motivator for Iran’s activities into nuclear ‘energy’ despite threats from the West, i.e. and the United Nations. Various missions by the IAEA have not yielded direct results declaring the presence of nuclear weapons, or their development, in Iran. However, Iran continues to ‘protect’ its interests, with the nuclear program aimed at providing an additional source of potential energy. However, this nation continues to assert the over-presence of the United States in the Middle East as a hindrance to development by Gulf nations including itself.

Even though the Iraqi menace is abridged by the international community, Iran cannot be convicted for its security sake. Iran analyze the greater than before influence of the United States in the Middle East affair subsequent to the Gulf War as a danger to its wellbeing and defense (Stephen, 2007). In addition, Iran sights the United States’ good relations with the Gulf nations, as disadvantageous to its power in the expanse.

The capacity of the United States to venture its power overseas is viewed as a defense threat by Iran. Iran is encircled by potentially nuclear neighbors such as Israel, Iraq, Russia, Pakistan, India, and China. Presently, with the exemption of Israel and Iraq, Iran upholds economic and political associations with these countries. Be supposed the dealings depreciate with Iran would desire the aptitude to prevent their prospective use of nuclear weapons against it. Decision to go nuclear could have been prompted the feeling of nuclear encirclement.

Necessities for building a bomb

It must be kept in mind that for Iran to clandestinely build up a nuclear weapons program, it will have to exceed numerous technological impediments that exist because of its consent to the nonproliferation treaty. U.S. suspicions already slowed Iran’s theoretical nuclear weapons program since the U.S. attempted to stop Iran’s unconcealed acquisition of nuclear material and tried to expose clandestine purchases of nuclear material. Iran had to rely on both unconcealed and clandestine techniques to acquire nuclear materials since its nuclear and industrial infrastructure was unable to manufacture all of the essential items required to assemble a nuclear device. Therefore, Iran had to rely on foreign nations to provide machinery and material through open contracts, and through clandestine means.

Iran has been trying to get hold of nuclear components essential for the construction of nuclear energy plant from abroad. Khomeini and his heir Rafsanjani had problems acquiring the contracts required to build the reactors and facilities desirable for the manufacture of nuclear energy. Once Russia and China helps Iran in setting up nuclear reactors, it is probable that Iran will use them for a nuclear program. On the other hand, Iran would have to take no notice of its commitment to the NPT, evade IAEA preserves, and trick IAEA inspectors in order to redirect the materials and exhausted fuel to a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA is vigilant that no other nation develops nuclear weapons programs the same as Iraq, and probably North Korea. It would embarrass IAEA to appear ineffectual in accomplishing their directives by failing to notice yet a different nuclear proliferate (Frederic, 2009).

Consecutively, for Iran to get hold of uranium enrichment, technology and dual-use items essential for mounting nuclear weapons, Iran would have to covertly buy it. In addition, Iran would need weapons-grade uranium for its nuclear weapons, which is tremendously not easy to get your hands on due to their highly-sensitive nature. Iran might prefer to obtain low-enriched uranium under the pretext of its emerging nuclear energy program. That would then be essential for Iran enrichment facility which would be used in the weapons program. Iran would have to dodge IAEA safeguards and scrutiny in order to reroute the fissile materials and to set up fortification. Even if unsubstantiated reports specify that Iran is attempting to set up uranium enrichment facilities other statements point out that Iran is not in possession of reprocessing facilities. To acquire weapons-grade material essential to construct enrichment facilities, Iran would be forced to circumvent the national export controls of the unsuspecting supplier nation, and the international export management for example the Nuclear Suppliers Group, provide the supplier state is a member of these regimes. Consequently, Iran would have to overcome many international hindrances should it desire to pursue nuclear weapons ambition.

Iran’s nuclear capability

Iran’s nuclear program was blatantly directed to launch a national nuclear energy program. Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear materials and training are to advance its nuclear energy programs. While these efforts could also be used to increase a nuclear weapons program, there are only uncertainties to base this on hard evidence. There is no substantiation available that Iran established enrichment technologies. At the same time, no direct evidence has been obtained that proves the Iranian government is running an overt operation with China and Russia to develop its nuclear capabilities. There is evidently a hefty intelligence gap between those nuclear equipment and facilities Iran is suspected of be having (Alexander, 2004).

It has been asserted by U.S interests that there are no any clandestine nuclear facilities in Iran, albeit many of Iran’s facilities are supposed of causative to Iran’s surreptitious nuclear weapons program. Based on what Iran acquired overtly, it seems highly unlikely that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has greatly improved. Estimates that Iran will have a bomb within a period of five appear impractical based on its current nuclear infrastructure. Iran will be fortunate if the plant constructed Russia is finished on time. Even the estimated amount of uranium deposits discovered at Saghand will not be excavated for at least another five, as stated by the IAEA. A couple of petite research reactors can barely be measured as the basis of a nuclear weapons program. Therefore, Iran does not have the infrastructure necessary for nuclear weapons proliferation, at least in a foreseeable prospect.

Iran’s program is much more faint and long-term. Iran’s blossoming nuclear infrastructure does not make available a practical enlightenment for this change. in spite of the fact that there is a short of proof in the manner that Iran has a nuclear weapons program, as affirmed there is proof that their is initial stage of development. Iran is all of a sudden considered to be developing nuclear weapons.

Iran’s foreign contract

Iran would have to obtain expertise, material, machinery, and fissile materials from overseas in order to productively assemble its nuclear power reactors and other amenities essential for the nonviolent use of nuclear energy. Once the Khomeini regime reinitiated Iran’s nuclear energy programs, it instantaneously began bargaining with many countries for help. The United States sighted these negotiations as an effort to secretly furnish itself with much needed technical know-how and expertise to its underground nuclear weapons program. Therefore, the United States applied force on the merchant countries not to accomplish their contracts with Iran. The United States, however, was unsuccessful since not all countries are simply intimidated by the U.S., and others are convinced that Iran is blameworthy of avoidance of its obligations under the NPT (Frederic, 2009).

Argentina: Nuclear trade dealings between Argentina and Iran have been widespread since 1987, when the two countries signed accords relating to the delivery of uranium. The $5.5 million transaction would supply Iran with a fresh core for its U.S. supplied five-megawatt research reactor in Tehran. The reactor could run on 20% highly-enriched uranium. The contract also comprised of the Argentine export of the 20% enriched uranium to Iran. 1988, the IAEA permitted the shift of 115.8 kg’s of uranium, which would be under IAEA safeguards. Purportedly, the deal also provided Iran with uranium enrichment information and technology, plus guidance. No clear proof exists that Argentina has supplied Iran with uranium enrichment know-how or technology and the U.S. was unable did not exert the influence to ‘urge’ Argentina against from increasing interests into the Uranium agreement. IAEA again endorsed that Argentina could continue to supply Iran with reactor fuel.

While the United States failed in preventing Argentina from selling 20% uranium to Iran, the United States was victorious in putting off Argentina from gratifying a contract with Iran. However, a change was recorded in 1992 when Argentina confirmed that it would provide Iran with a fuel manufacturing plant with the capabilities of converting uranium dioxide. However, the Argentineans were not as supportive when it came to a plant in which the Iranians would produce water at great consumptions. The U.S. however intervened and Argentina withdrew its support for the Iranian project, even though Iran asserted that the IAEA would back them up, at least as far as ensuring that the appropriate standards were met. This led to subsequent withdrawals by Argentineans who had planned to ship materials to Iran that same year.

Ion Beam Applications (IBA) obtained export consent from the Belgian government for a cyclotron that had been bought by Iran for its Karaj medical plant. According to IBA, the cyclotron can only be useful for medical purposes. There is no proof that the cyclotron is operational even though it was installed at Karaj. Iran and the Czech Republic discussed the possible purchase of nuclear equipment until the United States mounted pressure to the Czech Republic to promise not to trade nuclear technology to Iran. Czech admitted visiting Tehran to discuss provisions of parts for a nuclear power project (Fayazmanesh, 2008). A Czech delegation visited Iran in 1992, which hinted initial U.S. unease that there could be a pact in the prospect. United States successfully pressured Czech Republic not to sell equipment Iran.

The Eurodif agreement malformed when Ayatollah Khomeini took over the helm. Indeed, during the last 20 years of the 20th century, Iran declared that the agreement with France was airtight and as such, it deserved imports from the latter nation for nuclear fuel. France declined hence the problem remained in dispute until 1991, when France and Iran reached a consensus concerning the Eurodif matter. Additionally, reports of a clandestine protocol of the Eurodif resolution between Iran and France reemerged. These reports pointed out that France agreed to supply Iran with enriched uranium for its nuclear projects which meant its nuclear power reactors, once they are concluded and set. In 1991, the United States directed France to oblige in a high technology ban on Iran. France ignored U.S. efforts and came out boldly to justify their actions. United States persisted to persuade France to ban Iran but this botched because France wanted to enhance its level of trade with Iran.

Germany erection of the Bushehr reactors stopped when the Shah was removed from power in 1979. Iran thereby received a cold shoulder from the West Germans who declined to complete the projects. West Germany did not agree until Iran’s war with Iraq ended. Presently, Germany persists to decline to help Iran in finishing the nuclear ambition by tagging Iran a region of tension. Germany has denied reports that it illegally supplied Iran with sensitive materials from German companies. Iran has supposedly attempted to acquire dual-use mechanism from Germany that could be used for edification laboratory-scale gas centrifuges. German officials stated that their export controls have prohibited sales and smuggling of German dual-use apparatus to Iran. The German Federal Export Office pointed to the German Commodity Control Ordinance as the principal obstruction to Iranian nuclear procurement efforts in Germany (Stephen, 2007).

Iran’s nuclear consultations with India in 1991 were of immense worry to the United States. Iran and India negotiated the transaction of a 10-megawatt research reactor for installment at Iranian facility, and the probable purchase of a 220-megawatt nuclear power reactor. India at the outset recommended the sale of a five-megawatt research reactor, but Iran became adamant on a ten-megawatt reactor which could generate enough plutonium for one nuclear weapon within one year. Notwithstanding the reality that the research reactor would have been covered by IAEA safeguards, the United States forced India not to export the research reactor for dreading that Iran would use it to create weapons-of mass destruction. Although no reports point out what form of pressure the United States applied on India, India complied with U.S. demands. However, by March 1992, the agreement continued as intended despite U.S. pressure.

North Korea was a probable source for Iranian nuclear acquisitions. North Korea is alleged of developing a small figure of nuclear weapons. Iran and North Korea already have all-embracing relations in developing ballistic weaponry. Actually, North Korea’s substantial ballistic missile development program may have been principally financed by Iran. While there are no known nuclear ties connecting Iran and North Korea, it should not be ignored for the future. Both nations are cut off in the international system and are also habitually considered to be rogue states. The fact that few countries collaborate with them could push them together as buddies in many areas of business. Supposing North Korea has developed nuclear weapons, it is improbable that it would grant Iran any of its valuable weapons. However, it could offer Iran nuclear information and essential technologies (Frederic, 2009).

Pakistan ties with Iran are unclear and typically based on gossip. After Dr. Abdul Khan (leader of Pakistan’s clandestine uranium enrichment program), visited Iran it argued that Iran and Pakistan signed a nuclear agreement. This agreement is perceived to have included the training of Iranian nuclear specialists. The United States has been extremely worried that Iran may have received uranium enrichment technologies from Pakistan. In spite of Iranian declaration that refute such activities as uranium enrichment in Iran. Pakistan also affirmed that it would not sell overseas nuclear weapons-related technologies. German intelligence deemed that Iran acquired German gas centrifuge uranium enrichment technology through Pakistan. There were apprehensions that Pakistan helped out Iran with development of plutonium reprocessing plants. Pakistan denied these gossip, and U.S. professionals did not doubt their agenda. Hard evidence suggested that Iran obtained enrichment technology from Pakistan. Relations between both neighboring countries could deteriorate in the future, which could prove disastrous for Pakistan had it indeed helped Iran to develop weapons of mass destruction. Investigation exposing procurement network that Iraq used to supply its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs was unearthed. Iran would have had to reconstruct its system to shun detection by the U.N., which as a result would make its present smuggling even more difficult to expose.

Iran as per the IAEA

In February 1992 and November 1993 the IAEA established that Iran is in good standing with the NPT. IAEA visited Bushehr, the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, the Amirabad Nuclear Research Center, Saghand, Moallem Kalayeh and the Karaj Agricultural and Medical Research Center. This scrutiny was initiated by AEOI which of the six, three had never formerly been visited by the IAEA. In November 1993 the Second scrutiny was a political mission based on information presented by the United States. The United States collected its information from People’s Mojahedin an Iranian opposition group, which has issued declarations that reportedly exposed Iran’s nuclear weapons program and its nuclear facilities. Following the inspection, the IAEA could not verify any of the People’s Mojahedin allegations. IAEA visited plants in Tehran, Esfahan, and Karaj, and found no proof which was conflicting with Iran’s assertion that all its nuclear activities are passive (Fayazmanesh, 2008).

The United States is avaricious for straws regarding Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program by considering information offered by the Mojahedin. The opposition group clearly has its own schema which is to remove the existing government from power. Mojahedin has endeavored to furnish the United States with partial information so as to manipulate the U.S. to pressure Iran with bans and sanctions. Bearing in mind that Iraq is a foe of the United States, it’s bizarre that the U.S. would pay attention to the People’s Mojahedin, which is in Iraq. By taking into consideration information from such a group, the United States could destabilize its attempts to persuade European Union to stop all trade with Iran. The United States’ standing lacks integrity because it willingly accepted information from the Mojahedin as fact.

Allusions of U.S. Policy

European Union offers insight, of its comprehensive pursued engagement tangential by significant intimidation. In 1992, the European Union embarked on a strategy of critical discussion and engagement. This led to no visible development in Iranian human rights conditions but indeed degenerated for the duration of engagement. In 1995, Iranian authorities approved a law merging the task of a prosecutor and a judge in court. Discrimination of religious minorities augmented, and suppression remained ham-fisted. Between 1992 and 1996, the Iranian government refused to allow a UN Special Representative on the Human Rights Situation in Iran to visit the country.

Conceivably, human rights should not be an overriding concern of the U.S. Engagement has also been unsuccessful in altering Iranian prop up for terrorism or propagation activities, issues which impact directly on the safety of the American government. In the 1990s, the Iranian government responded to European engagement with state-sponsored murder of nonconformists and terror bombings. On the nuclear matter, the Europeans’ dialogue yielded no better than on human right. National Intelligence Estimate pointed out that Iran maintained an underground military nuclear program until 2003. IAEA reports suggested a premeditated counter effort that spanned for many years, to cover up material, amenities, and activities required to have been stated under the safeguards. The Islamic Republic was provoked by its desire to counteract global consensus against Iran. In spite of pronouncements in 2003 that Iran had been mounting a uranium centrifuge fortification program and a laser enrichment program, Germany persuaded the European Union authorities to give the Islamic Republic another chance so as not to lessen influence. The yearning to safeguard leverage to be exercised in potential diplomacy becomes a major dispute not in favor of ever using leverage or pursuing disciplinary actions based on an opposition action. In tactful calculation, ensuring continuance of diplomacy supersedes veracity (Stephen, 2007).

Evidently, diplomacy has been the approach of first resort. Regrettably, it does not always accomplish much. For diplomacy to be useful, the target government must sanction its diplomats to consult over disagreed issues and then stand for the agreements reached. Sadly, the Iranian nuclear program appeared more of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Office of the Supreme Leader somewhat than the Iranian Foreign Minister. The Barrack Obama government appears intent to series of policies. Any attempt to put down the foundation either for containment or avoidance and military strategies, Washington is indicating to its associates that the U.S. dedication to shield them is void. Arab states and Iran appear more disturbed that Obama have expressed by what measure the government judge successes will be. This is of vital importance to avert more confrontation with Iranian officials.

If it appears that Iran is able to acquire greater nuclear capability, United States will have to formulate greater accommodation to Tehran’s wellbeing. This will immensely obstruct U.S. efforts to promote diplomatic hold up for its policy. Poor timing of diplomacy can incongruously weaken its own effectiveness. If Israel will be persuaded that Western states will stand aside as Iran attains nuclear capability hence posing an existential danger therefore decides to launch a defensive military strike. Such an event could swiftly lead to a regional inferno rendering the United States aloof, in spite of the White House’s goal.

At the very least, the U.S. policy will harm relations with Iran further, thereby increasing the hatred and mistrust that exists between the two countries. The United States’ export control policy toward Iran could potentially undermine the entire nonproliferation regime. This is especially so considering the fact that after analyzing Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, there appears to be little basis for the United States to adopt such an extreme policy at this time.

The U.S. policy undermines NPT (Article IV), which states; NPT member countries in excellent status are permitted access to nuclear programs for sole purpose of passive use of nuclear energy (Frederic, 2009). Since IAEA found Iran to be in good status, it is legally permitted to assemble nuclear power reactors. But the reality that Iran is a terrorist state, a foe of Israel, that it exports deep-seated beliefs in the expanse, it stands as an obstruction to U.S. goals and that in 1979 it took U.S. nationals hostage. If the United States has confidential evidence against Iran, it should present the evidence to the IAEA. Since evidently the United States has no facts that it is enthusiastic to openly share, it should stay observant in case firm proof comes out that actually Iran is developing a nuclear weapons.

State of Play

International relations should inspire U.S. policy, as well as the present U.S. and European Union diplomatic approach and numerous United Nations Security Council declarations have not accomplish much in discontinuing Iran from mounting its nuclear capacity. Since disclosure of its underground enrichment program, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established that the Iranian regime has set up 4,000 centrifuges in a plant intended to accommodate a whooping 50,000. IAEA scrutiny is inadequate. IAEA’s personal authorization, the association can merely scrutinize confirmed nuclear facilities. Even though Iranian authorities are revealed to have assembled similar but concealed enrichment facilities, IAEA inspectors would not unavoidably be certified to scrutinize them devoid of Iranian approval. Additionally, a large amount of the Iranian enrichment dispute ignores the likelihood that Iranian officials might manufacture plutonium at Arak where their heavy water plant is based.

National Intelligence Estimate reported that Iran stopped missile blueprint project in 2003, the National Intelligence Estimate left no room for relieve. Its simulated division between martial and civilian disagrees with veracity where such difference cannot be made. In spite of Tehran’s affirmations, its program was not believed to be intrinsically peaceful in nature. Tehran had a lengthy record of dishonesty and trickery; therefore the Iranian officials would have far bigger energy security if they devoted a portion of their nuclear program’s expenses in additional development of their natural gas facilities, refinery building and allotment network. Accordingly, the Islamic Republic of Iran assertions that its nuclear program is provoked only by energy concerns are disputable (Fayazmanesh, 2008). Iranian government’s legally disputes that the Non-Proliferation Treaty permits its recent nuclear expansion is not plausible.

Diplomatic Agreement

Embarking upon a tactful resolution with Islamic republic of Iran will compel a numerous extra policy verdicts. There is a query regarding what inducement the United States and international community should present to Iran in order to encourage its compliance. It is believed that the incentives already offered to Iran e.g. end to segregation, spare parts for its old aircraft navy, upgrading of domestic oil production, political collaboration must stay put part incase of any prospect package. Regulated lifting of sanctions with Iranian conformity is an additional inducement, as are prospective defense warranty and reassurance. The President will have to stabilize any new inducement with the familiarity that Iranian bureaucrats may perceive such recommendations as weak point to abuse. Both the Iranian government and other latent proliferators might also read between the lines that compliance to present enticements as rewards for Iran’s disobedience (Alexander, 2004).

United States will be required to establish whether to uphold the strategy of the Bush government and the European Union against consulting with Tehran over the nuclear matter save for Iran suspending its enrichment activities, or drop this prerequisite to consultation. Every formal discussion with Iran lacking deferral of enrichment could rebound. The United States implicitly would negate all UN Security Council declarations demanding a termination of Iranian uranium enrichment strategy. Iranian authorities are liable to interpreting U.S. flexibility as compliance to the Iranian standing that it must be allowed to enrich which is all the more basis to increase many-sided sanctions while new inducements are considered.

Should the Iranian President choose that the single way to check Tehran’s earnestness about resolving the nuclear disagreement is to throw away all conditions to compromise, observe several principles (Stephen, 2007). The United States must merely go into the negotiation from a standing of strength. Implying that the United States be obliged to acting in concert and with the full prop up of its followers. It must be capable of indicating either that it has already stopped all economic stress on Iran, or are geared up to do so in a consequential approach just incase Iran wont agree to discard its expedition for nuclear weapons. Clarity of U.S.-Iranian discussions will not be unrestricted, but will be restricted to a set time period so that Tehran does not try to bail out of the efforts.

A rigorous diplomatic exertion of this sort is essential to exhibit a unified front and generate new power against Iran. Unswerving dialogue with the Iranian government can only be successful if the United States gets much needed cooperation by European allies, India, China and Persian Gulf states


The subject of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is on the forefront of international defense worries. Recently, Iran has confessed of being in possession of uranium enrichment program, startling the global community. Its drive to acquire this weaponry has been examined to be motivated by the need to obtain nuclear weapons for defense reasons. Iran’s prolonged clash with the U. S. begun during the Shah era and the Islamic revolution in 1979. All through this era, Iran’s leaders alleged that the U. S. was the prime enemy of the Islamic nations. Consequently having two long-drawn-out conflicts with Israel and Iraq. Iraq and Israel’s nuclear weapons programs startled Iran and it became anxious to develop a prevention facility against Iraq with whom it fought the greatest wars. With the US government taking antagonistic foreign policies towards Iran, the latter’s defense unease increased. The George W. Bush administration’s assertion of Iran one of the centre evil, severely endangered and disgraced Iran. This threat aggravated the Iran’s administration on the alleged reason that it was in ownership of weapons of mass destruction. A humanity that was ripped on many of the significant conjugal issues, Iran remained integrated on the subject of nuclear weapons acquisition. US verdict to attack Iraq devoid of the endorsement of the U.N. confirmed the absence of a nuclear prevention capacity; as a result, Iran became unrelenting in its ambitions to acquire weapons of mass destruction and audaciously proclaiming its resolution to augment uranium. Non-aggressive US policies can be influential to finishing the protracted Iran-US conflict. This most definitely will persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons ambition (Frederic, 2009).

America’s policy is based on ideological reasons most of which hubs on the revulsion and distrust on Iran. Even though Iran has numerous geopolitical and defense basis to build nuclear weapons, its infrastructure is minute and jumbled. Claims that Iran could bring into being nuclear weapons within the 5 years are unrealistic. Supposing other countries in the first class category desire also to pursue that program, the U.S. should powerfully implement its national export control scheme. No state would want Iran or any other nation for that matter to build up nuclear weapons, but the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) should not be tainted to accomplish that objective.

It may a little overdue to prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear power state, although it is not too late to stop it from becoming a nuclear weapons hazard. There are no trouble-free solutions. In the least every diplomatic resolution entails wide-ranging strategies involving monetary and military machinery undertaken in combination with linked and regional nations. It government to establish what travails the Iranian citizens have got to tolerate prior to such an accord is reached. The probability of the same is immense. They entail regional tranquility and steadiness, power security, multilateralism efficiency, and safeguarding of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime.

However, whichever accord symbolizes not the closing stages of the predicament, but the commencement of an unrelenting stage for which the United States and international community must put in order. Iranian agreement with its pledges must be demonstrable, and any nuclear doings must be scrutinized expansively and in real time. Islamic republic of Iran is an essential nation and its homecoming to the international community through its government adherence to its global obligations should be welcomed. Since Iran is an exclusive and advantageously significant country, it is indispensable that the leader and relevant policymakers comprehends its convolutions (Frederic, 2009). Similarly, the procedures of nuclear enrichment are frequently talked about in the conceptual, but the particulars of diverse enrichment techniques and capacities matter. In addition, creating an approach to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis, United States endeavored to present a resource to enhanced understanding Iran’s governance and administrative approach, deviating attitudes of the Iranian government, merits and demerits encompassing many of the strategies which is often conversed by policymakers. Finally the international community should endeavor to offer a technological scrutiny of both precedent and latent Iranian nuclear enrichment strategies.



Alexander, T. (2004). Reshaping rogue states. MIT Press: 5th Avenue, NY

Congressional Information Service. (1993). American foreign policy index. Congressional Information Service Inc: Washington, DC

Fayazmanesh, S. (2008). The United States and Iran. Westward, UK: Routledge

Frederic, M. (2009). Saudi-Iranian relations since the fall of Saddam. Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, CA

Stephen M.W, (2007). The Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux: Union Square West, NY

William, K. (2007). An examination of US policy toward Iranian nuclear proliferation. U.S. Army War College: Washington, DC

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